Saba vs Closed-End Funds: Boaz Weinstein's Asset-Class-Wide Activist Campaign
Coordinated 13D filings across 50-plus CEFs run by BlackRock, Nuveen, MFS and Pimco; discount arbitrage paired with activist pressure; BIGZ and BMEZ settle on a $1.6bn tender; SEC opens governance review
Background
Boaz Weinstein joined Deutsche Bank in 1998 at the age of 25, built the German lender's credit derivatives trading desk, and made managing director at 27. Inside Deutsche he ran Saba Principal Strategies, a proprietary credit book that at its peak controlled roughly $30bn of positions. He spun the team out as Saba Capital Management in 2009, with the flagship master fund launching that August with about $140m to $160m of capital. Weinstein's public reputation was set in 2012 by the London Whale trade: he identified that JPMorgan's Chief Investment Office, run by trader Bruno Iksil, had built an outsized position in the IG9 credit index, took the opposite side, and earned Saba an estimated $200m to $300m in profits while JPMorgan eventually disclosed losses of more than $6.2bn. Saba's assets under management peaked at $5.6bn after the trade. As of 2025 the firm manages roughly $5bn to $6bn.
Closed-end funds, or CEFs, are publicly listed investment vehicles that raise capital through an IPO and, unlike open-end mutual funds, cannot be redeemed at NAV. The share price trades in the secondary market and routinely sits at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to NAV. Because shareholders cannot force redemption, the discount can persist indefinitely unless the manager takes action through tender offers, share repurchases or conversion to an open-end structure. Total US CEF assets are roughly $250bn, dominated by BlackRock, Nuveen, MFS, Pimco, Invesco and Eaton Vance, which together control about 70 per cent of the market. For asset managers, the CEF wrapper is an attractive permanent capital vehicle that produces stable fee income. For shareholders, the chronic discount is a permanent destruction of value, and it is the structural weakness that Saba's campaign was built around.
Saba's playbook is uniform across targets. The fund accumulates a position of 5 to 15 per cent of shares outstanding while the CEF trades at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to NAV. It files a Schedule 13D demanding that the board adopt a tender offer, an enhanced buyback programme or an open-end conversion. If the board refuses, Saba puts forward its own slate of trustees at the annual meeting. Even when the proxy contest fails, the public pressure typically narrows the discount, allowing Saba to exit at a smaller spread. The asymmetric pay-off is what made the strategy industrial: the same template can be applied to dozens of funds at once because the target is the structure, not the underlying business. Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2023 Saba filed simultaneous 13Ds against roughly 20 BlackRock-managed CEFs, the first instance of a mass campaign against an asset class.
BlackRock's defence rested on a quorum bylaw that required nominees to be approved by holders of a majority of all outstanding shares, not merely a majority of those voting. With retail investors holding the bulk of CEF shares and turnout chronically low, the bylaw effectively guaranteed that dissident slates would fail. In the spring of 2024 only about 11 per cent of outstanding shares voted in favour of Saba's nominees at BlackRock funds including BIGZ and BMEZ, well short of the required threshold. Saba won partial victories at smaller Nuveen and Eaton Vance funds with higher retail participation and sued 16 funds in 2023 arguing that the control share bylaws some managers had introduced violated the Investment Company Act of 1940. A 2024 ruling from the US District Court for the Southern District of New York struck down certain Nuveen control share provisions as inconsistent with federal law.
The inflection point came after the proxy losses. In the second half of 2024 BlackRock introduced enhanced quarterly buybacks of up to 2.5 per cent of outstanding shares at 12 or more of its CEFs. In June 2025 BlackRock agreed with Saba to tender for 50 per cent of the outstanding shares of BlackRock Innovation and Growth Term Trust (BIGZ) and 40 per cent of BlackRock Health Sciences Term Trust (BMEZ) at 99.5 per cent of NAV, a combined transaction of about $1.6bn. Saba agreed to tender all of its holdings and observe a three-year standstill on activism against BlackRock funds. Invesco's Pennsylvania and New York muni CEFs separately agreed to 25 per cent tender offers at 99 per cent of NAV. The SEC opened a review of CEF governance rules. The Supreme Court took up FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund and heard oral argument on 10 December 2025, focused on whether the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides a private right of action. In December 2024 Saba expanded the campaign to seven UK investment trusts, including Herald Investment Trust, where it has since secured tender offers or wind-down events at six of the seven targets.
Deal Summary
- Deal Value
- 50+ CEFs targeted; ~$50bn+ in affected AUM
- Acquirer
- Saba Capital Management, L.P.
- Target
- 50+ CEFs at BlackRock, Nuveen, MFS, Pimco, Invesco, Eaton Vance
- Announced
- October 2023 (first 13D wave)
- Closed
- Ongoing; BIGZ/BMEZ settlement June 2025
- Country
- USA
Executive Summary
- Saba Capital, run by Boaz Weinstein, opened a coordinated 13D campaign against roughly 20 BlackRock-managed CEFs in Q4 2023; the first instance of an activist treating an asset class, rather than a single issuer, as the target
- Standardised playbook: accumulate at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to NAV, demand tender offers, enhanced buybacks or open-end conversion, run a dissident slate when boards refuse, exit at a tighter discount whether the vote wins or loses
- BlackRock won the 2024 proxy votes by relying on a quorum bylaw requiring approval from holders of a majority of all outstanding shares; only about 11 per cent of outstanding shares backed Saba's nominees
- In late 2024 BlackRock introduced enhanced quarterly buybacks of up to 2.5 per cent at 12 or more CEFs, a partial concession that matched several of Saba's demands
- June 2025: BlackRock and Saba agreed to a $1.6bn settlement under which BIGZ tendered for 50 per cent and BMEZ for 40 per cent of outstanding shares at 99.5 per cent of NAV; Saba agreed to a three-year standstill on BlackRock funds
- SEC opened a review of CEF governance rules; the Supreme Court heard oral argument in FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund on 10 December 2025 on whether the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides a private right of action
- Campaign expanded to roughly 25 Nuveen funds, plus targets at MFS, Pimco, Invesco and Eaton Vance; in December 2024 Saba opened a parallel campaign against seven UK investment trusts and has since obtained liquidity events at six of them
Industry Overview
The US closed-end fund industry holds roughly $250bn in assets. CEFs raise capital through an IPO and then trade in the secondary market, where the price can deviate from net asset value. Persistent discounts of 10 to 15 per cent are common because shareholders cannot redeem at NAV. For asset managers the CEF is an attractive permanent capital vehicle that generates stable fee income; for shareholders the chronic discount is a permanent destruction of value. Saba's campaign exploits that structural mismatch on an industrial scale, treating the wrapper itself, rather than any single fund, as the target.
US CEF industry AUM
~$250bn
Investment Company Institute estimate
Saba campaign AUM impact
~$50bn+
Combined assets of the 50-plus targeted funds
Typical NAV discount
10 to 15%
Chronic; a structural feature of non-redeemable vehicles
BlackRock CEF AUM
~$40bn
Largest US CEF sponsor
Quorum requirement
Majority of shares outstanding
Higher than the usual majority-of-votes-cast standard; functions as a structural defence
BIGZ/BMEZ settlement size
~$1.6bn
Combined tender offers at 99.5% of NAV announced June 2025
CEFs are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The manager acts as adviser to the fund and is appointed by the board; independent trustees must constitute a majority of directors. In practice, trustees are typically selected on the recommendation of the manager and serve on the boards of dozens of related funds, a cluster board structure that critics have long argued produces de facto board capture. Saba's campaign is the first to take that critique to the asset class as a whole.
Key Players
Company Overview: Representative target: BlackRock Innovation and Growth Term Trust (BIGZ)
BIGZ is a BlackRock-managed closed-end fund that completed its IPO in March 2021, raising roughly $2bn at an offering price of $25.00 per share. The fund invests in small and mid-cap US innovation and growth equities, including some private and SPAC exposures, and is structured as a term trust with a scheduled termination date in March 2031. The 2022 and 2023 growth-equity sell-off compressed NAV sharply, and the market price traded at a 15 to 20 per cent discount through much of 2023. Saba began accumulating in 2023 and disclosed a position of roughly 15 to 20 per cent of outstanding shares in early 2024, demanding a tender offer, an open-end conversion or an early termination. In June 2025 BlackRock agreed to tender for 50 per cent of BIGZ shares at 99.5 per cent of NAV.
IPO date
March 2021
Offering price $25.00; ~$2bn raised
Term trust maturity
March 2031
10-year scheduled termination
Investment mandate
US small and mid-cap innovation equities
Includes some private and SPAC exposure
Discount to NAV (2023)
15 to 20%
Growth-equity drawdown widened the spread
Saba ownership (early 2024)
~15 to 20%
Disclosed on Schedule 13D; largest outside holder
BIGZ market cap (2024)
~$1.6bn
At the time of the tender offer settlement
AUM by Segment
Governance Overview
Saba's CEF campaign is structurally different from single-issuer activism. The target is not the business strategy of a particular company but the legal wrapper that 50-plus funds share. Shareholder registries, board structures and governance defects are therefore close to identical across funds. The table below uses BIGZ as the representative target. Two governance weaknesses define the asset class: a heavily retail register that produces low turnout, and quorum bylaws requiring approval from holders of a majority of all outstanding shares. Saba's campaign attacked both.
Typical BlackRock CEF board. Independent trustee count looks high, but most directors serve simultaneously on the boards of dozens of related BlackRock funds in a [cluster board] arrangement, which Saba and several governance specialists characterise as de facto board capture.
Average discounts at campaign funds narrowed from roughly 15 to 20 per cent before Saba's involvement to 8 to 12 per cent across the portfolio by 2025. Funds that settled (BIGZ, BMEZ and the two Invesco vehicles) effectively eliminated the discount on the tendered portion by repurchasing at 99 to 99.5 per cent of NAV. Activist gains per fund are estimated at roughly $5 to $10 a share.
Because shareholders cannot redeem, the market price can trade at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to NAV indefinitely unless the board authorises tender offers, buybacks or conversion. The discount is the core structural defect that Saba's campaign exploits, and it is present in every one of the 50-plus targeted funds.
Many CEFs require approval of new trustees or a change in adviser by holders of a majority of all outstanding shares, rather than a majority of votes cast. With retail-dominated registers and turnout often below 50 per cent, the bylaw functionally guarantees defeat for dissident slates. Saba's 2024 BlackRock nominees were backed by roughly 11 per cent of outstanding shares and therefore failed.
Several managers, notably Nuveen, adopted control share provisions from 2023 onwards that strip or limit voting rights of shareholders above a 10 to 15 per cent threshold. Saba sued 16 funds in 2023 arguing the provisions violate the Investment Company Act of 1940; the SDNY struck down certain Nuveen provisions as inconsistent with federal law in 2024.
The same individuals frequently sit on the boards of dozens of funds advised by a single manager. Although they satisfy the independence test on paper, Saba and other governance commentators argue that the cluster arrangement produces effective dependence on the manager and undermines the negotiating leverage of independent trustees.
Tender offer or open-end conversion at ~20 BlackRock CEFs
Dissident slates defeated in 2024 by the quorum bylaw, but Saba secured a $1.6bn tender at BIGZ (50 per cent) and BMEZ (40 per cent) at 99.5 per cent of NAV in June 2025; demonstrates the asymmetric pay-off of the strategy
Invalidate control share bylaws at roughly 25 Nuveen funds
SDNY ruled in 2024 that certain Nuveen control share provisions violate the Investment Company Act of 1940
Tender offers at Invesco Pennsylvania and New York muni CEFs
Both funds agreed in 2024 to tender for 25 per cent of outstanding shares at 99 per cent of NAV; Saba agreed to a standstill
Enhanced share repurchase programmes at 12-plus BlackRock CEFs
BlackRock introduced quarterly buybacks of up to 2.5 per cent of outstanding shares at 12 or more funds in the second half of 2024; a partial concession that mirrored Saba's demands
Dissident slates at MFS, Pimco and Eaton Vance bond CEFs
Mixed outcomes through 2024 to 2025; partial wins at smaller funds, several proxy contests still pending
SEC review of CEF governance
SEC opened a governance review in 2024 to 2025; Supreme Court heard oral argument in FS Credit Opportunities v. Saba on 10 December 2025 on whether the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides a private right of action
Deal Structure
Saba runs the campaign as a multi-target structure. At each fund the process is identical: accumulate in the open market at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to NAV until reaching 5 to 15 per cent ownership, file a Schedule 13D, demand a tender offer, an enhanced buyback, an open-end conversion or a change of adviser, and propose a dissident slate when the board refuses. Standardisation is possible because the target is the legal wrapper, not the underlying portfolio. Settlements to date include enhanced quarterly buybacks at 12-plus BlackRock funds, the $1.6bn BIGZ and BMEZ tender at 99.5 per cent of NAV, and 25 per cent tender offers at the two Invesco muni CEFs at 99 per cent of NAV.
Pre-Deal
Saba Capital
Boaz Weinstein; AUM ~$5bn to $6bn
MFS, Pimco, Invesco, Eaton Vance
~10 additional CEFs targeted
BlackRock CEF group
~20 CEFs targeted
Nuveen CEF group
~25 muni CEFs targeted
Retail holders
~60% of each CEF; low turnout
Post-Deal
BIGZ and BMEZ
Tender for 50% and 40% of shares at 99.5% of NAV (~$1.6bn)
Saba Capital
Tendered BIGZ/BMEZ shares; 3-year standstill on BlackRock funds
12-plus BlackRock CEFs
Enhanced quarterly buybacks up to 2.5% of shares outstanding
Two Invesco muni CEFs
25% tender at 99% of NAV
Nuveen (subset)
Certain control share bylaws struck down by SDNY
SEC and Supreme Court
CEF governance review; FS Credit v. Saba oral argument
Key Terms
Advisors
Saba's activist legal work is led by Olshan Frome Wolosky, the firm most closely associated with the shareholder-activist bar in the United States. Trading strategy, accumulation and the dissident campaign mechanics sit with Saba's in-house research and trading team. On the defence side, the targeted managers retained Investment Company Act of 1940 specialists: Sidley Austin for BlackRock, Davis Polk for Invesco and certain other managers, and Skadden Arps for Nuveen. Both sides have used the leading proxy solicitors, including Innisfree, D.F. King and Sodali.
Saba Capital (activist) Advisors
Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP
Legal counsel (activism specialist)Handled the Schedule 13D filings, proxy contests and the 16-fund control share litigation
Saba in-house research and trading
Strategy, accumulation, proxy operationsLed by Boaz Weinstein; covered discount analysis, accumulation timing and selection of dissident nominees
Saratoga Proxy Consulting (per public filings)
Proxy solicitorShareholder identification, vote solicitation and messaging
Target asset managers (defence) Advisors
Sidley Austin LLP
Legal counsel to BlackRock1940 Act work, quorum bylaw defence, and BIGZ and BMEZ tender offer structuring
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
Legal counsel to several managersInvesco and other settlement negotiations; 1940 Act compliance work
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
Legal counsel to NuveenControl share litigation defence; advised on poison pill mechanics
Innisfree M&A, D.F. King
Proxy solicitorsVote solicitation and quorum strategy on behalf of fund boards
BlackRock in-house legal and treasury
Internal coordinationRan the proxy programme, designed the enhanced buyback policy and negotiated the BIGZ and BMEZ settlement
Adviser assignments are based on public proxy filings (DFAN14A and DEFA14A), Schedule 13Ds on SEC EDGAR and media reporting, and may differ from the underlying engagement letters.
Financials
Figures in $m; reflects BIGZ fund-level operating income (dividend and interest income net of management fees). See BlackRock BIGZ N-CSR for audited figures.
| Item | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | USD 35M | USD 42M | USD 48M |
| COGS | USD 0M | USD 0M | USD 0M |
| Gross Profit | USD 35M | USD 42M | USD 48M |
| SG&A | USD 28M | USD 30M | USD 31M |
| Operating Income | USD 7M | USD 12M | USD 17M |
| EBITDA | USD 7M | USD 12M | USD 17M |
| EBITDA Margin | 20.0% | 28.6% | 35.4% |
Valuation
The economic engine of the campaign is the combination of discount arbitrage and activist pressure. Saba enters at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to NAV; the activist campaign alone typically tightens the discount by 5 to 10 percentage points; and settlements at 99 or 99.5 per cent of NAV effectively eliminate the discount on the tendered portion. Per-fund gains are estimated at roughly $5 to $10 a share, with cumulative gains across the 50-plus campaign portfolio running into the hundreds of millions of dollars.
| Metric | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Typical accumulation discount | 10 to 15% below NAV | Average entry discount across targeted funds |
| Discount after activist pressure | 5 to 8% below NAV | Narrowing of 5 to 10 percentage points from the 13D and proxy campaign alone |
| BIGZ tender price | 99.5% of NAV | 50% of outstanding shares; June 2025 |
| BMEZ tender price | 99.5% of NAV | 40% of outstanding shares; June 2025 |
| Invesco muni tender price | 99% of NAV | 25% of outstanding shares; 2024 |
| Estimated activist gain per fund | ~$5 to $10 per share | Combined discount narrowing and tender pricing |
| BIGZ plus BMEZ combined size | ~$1.6bn | Total capital returned under the BlackRock settlement |
| Affected AUM across all targets | ~$50bn+ | Combined assets of the 50-plus funds in the campaign |
| Saba AUM (2025) | ~$5bn to $6bn | Founded by Boaz Weinstein in 2009; peaked at $5.6bn after the London Whale trade |
Figures are derived from SEC filings (Schedule 13D, N-CSR, DEF14A and DFAN14A), media reporting and CEF Connect, and are estimates of realised economics.
Share this deal
Deal Rationale
Why Saba targeted an entire asset class
- Structural homogeneity: every closed-end fund shares the same defect (a persistent discount to NAV), so a single playbook scales to dozens of funds without bespoke diligence
- Asymmetric pay-off: even when proxy contests fail, the public campaign narrows the discount, so Saba can exit at a smaller spread; the trade is profitable whether the vote wins or loses
- Industry cartel dynamics: BlackRock and Nuveen defend the asset class with identical bylaws and cluster boards, so only a campaign waged at the class level can crack the joint defence
- London Whale lesson: large market inefficiencies do not unwind with a single shock; sustained pressure on the structure is required, an idea Weinstein has transplanted from credit derivatives to closed-end funds
- Leverage from concentrated capital: with roughly $5bn to $6bn of AUM, Saba can move the marginal price of a $250bn asset class by deploying 2 to 3 per cent of the market into coordinated positions
- Regulatory and judicial channel: the SEC review and the Supreme Court case create the prospect of changing the rules of the asset class itself, not just the behaviour of a single sponsor
Why the managers settled in part
- Pyrrhic victory in the proxy: winning by relying on a bylaw that defeats motions backed by 11 per cent of outstanding shares is hard to defend in front of regulators and the press
- Reputational exposure of cluster boards: the SEC, the Supreme Court and the financial media are now scrutinising trustee independence in a way that threatens the broader asset-management franchise
- Protect the fee stream: a 40 to 50 per cent tender on a single fund still preserves the manager's fee income on the remaining shares; the cost is manageable relative to the franchise risk
- Block the copycats: Cornerstone, Bulldog Investors and Karpus have all begun running variations of the Saba playbook; a three-year standstill with Saba removes the largest activist from the calendar
- Pre-empt regulation: with the SEC reviewing CEF governance rules, a voluntary concession signals good faith and may temper the eventual regulatory outcome
- BIGZ is a term trust: it was scheduled to terminate in 2031 in any case, so an early partial liquidation at 99.5 per cent of NAV is a tolerable acceleration rather than a strategic loss
Post-Deal Assessment (As of 11 June 2026 as of)
By the middle of 2026 the campaign has produced a clear verdict at the level of the asset class. BlackRock's June 2025 settlement at BIGZ and BMEZ, worth roughly $1.6bn, validated the model: Saba lost the proxy and still extracted a substantial capital return at close to NAV. BlackRock's enhanced buyback programmes at 12 or more funds, Invesco's 25 per cent tenders, the partial invalidation of Nuveen's control share bylaws, the SEC's open review of CEF governance and the Supreme Court argument in FS Credit Opportunities v. Saba together amount to a rewriting of the rules of the wrapper. Saba's December 2024 expansion into UK investment trusts has produced liquidity events at six of the seven original targets, including Herald Investment Trust. Copycats including Cornerstone, Bulldog Investors and Karpus have institutionalised the playbook, which now functions as a recognised sub-strategy within the activist hedge-fund universe.
Positives
- $1.6bn BIGZ and BMEZ settlement: a definitive proof of concept for activist returns even after a proxy loss
- Enhanced quarterly buybacks at 12-plus BlackRock CEFs: a first wave of structural concessions that has set a new industry baseline
- 2024 SDNY ruling partially invalidating Nuveen control share bylaws: a judicial channel for changing asset-class rules
- SEC governance review and the Supreme Court argument: regulatory and judicial pressure compounding in parallel
- December 2024 expansion to seven UK investment trusts: liquidity events at six of the original targets confirms the model travels across jurisdictions
- Emergence of Cornerstone, Bulldog Investors and Karpus copycats: the playbook is now a market-standard strategy
Risks & Concerns
- Quorum bylaws remain effective: BlackRock continues to win proxy contests on the merits and may resist further settlements
- Crowded trade: copycat capital chasing the same discounts compresses entry spreads and reduces Saba's economics
- Defensive innovation: managers may engineer more sophisticated charter and bylaw protections to blunt future campaigns
- Supreme Court outcome: an adverse ruling in FS Credit Opportunities v. Saba could narrow or eliminate the private right of action under the Investment Company Act of 1940 that supports much of Saba's litigation
- Activist fatigue: managing 50-plus simultaneous campaigns plus accumulated standstills constrains the pipeline of new targets
- Industry contraction: sponsors may slow or restructure new CEF launches, shrinking the supply of discounted vehicles that the strategy needs
This announcement appears as a matter of record only
Saba Capital Management
Acquirer
50+ CEFs at BlackRock, Nuveen, MFS, Pimco, Invesco
Target
Saba vs Closed-End Funds: Asset-Class-Wide Activism
Transaction Size
Affected AUM ~$50bn+
BIGZ/BMEZ settlement ~$1.6bn
EV / EBITDA
N/A (activist)
Multiple
Closed
Ongoing (settlement June 2025)
Deal Date
Editor's Note
Saba's CEF campaign is the first time activism has scaled from the issuer level to the asset-class level. The principle that Boaz Weinstein took from the London Whale trade, that large market inefficiencies must be unwound through sustained pressure rather than a single decisive event, has been transplanted with unusual precision from credit derivatives to closed-end funds. The asymmetric pay-off, where the trade is profitable whether the proxy wins or loses, has rewritten the risk-and-reward of hedge-fund activism. Whether the model continues to compound now depends on what the Supreme Court does with the private right of action under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and how aggressively sponsors innovate around quorum and control share defences. The campaign has, in effect, put a price on the value of permanent capital in the asset management business.
Key Concepts in This Deal
The persistent gap between a CEF's market price and its net asset value, typically 10 to 15 per cent. The discount can last indefinitely because shareholders cannot redeem at NAV; it is the structural defect that Saba's campaign exploits.
An activist strategy that treats a category of legal vehicles, rather than individual companies, as a single target. Saba's coordinated 13D filings against 50-plus closed-end funds is the first large-scale instance.
The 2012 episode in which Boaz Weinstein took the opposite side of a large credit-derivative position built up by JPMorgan's Chief Investment Office trader Bruno Iksil, earning Saba an estimated $200m to $300m. The trade established Weinstein's reputation and informs the patient pressure model now applied to closed-end funds.
An activist demand that a closed-end fund be converted into an open-end mutual fund, allowing shareholders to redeem at NAV. It is the most threatening demand to a manager because it eliminates the permanent capital wrapper; in practice it is usually traded against tender offers or buybacks.
A demand that a CEF repurchase a meaningful portion of its outstanding shares (typically 25 to 50 per cent) at close to NAV (99 to 99.5 per cent). BIGZ at 50 per cent, BMEZ at 40 per cent and the Invesco muni funds at 25 per cent are the standard outcomes of settlements in Saba's campaign.
The review that the Securities and Exchange Commission opened during 2024 to 2025 into CEF governance rules, including quorum bylaws, control share provisions and trustee independence. It is rare for a single activist campaign to trigger an asset-class-wide regulatory review.
The set of partial concessions made by BlackRock through 2024 and 2025: quarterly buybacks of up to 2.5 per cent at 12 or more CEFs and the $1.6bn BIGZ and BMEZ tender. A manager that won the underlying proxy votes nevertheless agreed to material capital returns.
The combination of accumulating at a discount to NAV, narrowing the discount through activist pressure, and exiting at a tighter spread. The pay-off is asymmetric because the discount tends to narrow whether or not the proxy contest succeeds.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is Boaz Weinstein and what is Saba Capital?
Boaz Weinstein founded Saba Capital Management in 2009 after spinning out the proprietary credit-trading group he had built at Deutsche Bank. He is best known for the 2012 London Whale trade, in which Saba took the opposite side of a large position built up by JPMorgan's Chief Investment Office and earned an estimated $200m to $300m in profits. Saba currently manages roughly $5bn to $6bn.
Why are closed-end funds an attractive target for activists?
Closed-end funds raise capital in an IPO and then trade in the secondary market without redemption at NAV. The price commonly sits at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to net asset value, a gap that persists indefinitely unless the manager authorises tender offers, buybacks or conversion to an open-end structure. For shareholders the discount is a permanent loss of value; for activists it is a homogeneous defect that scales across dozens of funds.
How does Saba's combined discount-arbitrage-and-activism strategy work?
The process has four steps. First, Saba accumulates 5 to 15 per cent of a CEF in the open market at a 10 to 15 per cent discount to NAV. Second, it files a Schedule 13D demanding a tender offer, an enhanced buyback or an open-end conversion. Third, if the board refuses, it runs a dissident slate at the annual meeting. Fourth, even when the proxy contest fails, the public pressure tends to narrow the discount, so Saba can exit at a tighter spread. The pay-off is asymmetric: the strategy is profitable whether the vote wins or loses.
What happened in the proxy fight with BlackRock?
In 2024 Saba ran dissident slates at roughly 20 BlackRock-managed closed-end funds, including BIGZ and BMEZ. BlackRock relied on a quorum bylaw that required approval from holders of a majority of all outstanding shares. Saba's nominees were backed by roughly 11 per cent of outstanding shares and were defeated. Despite that loss, BlackRock subsequently introduced enhanced quarterly buybacks at 12 or more CEFs, and in June 2025 agreed a $1.6bn settlement under which BIGZ tendered for 50 per cent and BMEZ for 40 per cent of outstanding shares at 99.5 per cent of NAV. Saba accepted a three-year standstill on BlackRock funds.
What are quorum and control share bylaws?
A quorum bylaw, as used at many CEFs, requires new trustees or a change of adviser to be approved by holders of a majority of all outstanding shares, rather than a majority of votes cast. With retail-dominated registers and low turnout, the bylaw functionally guarantees defeat for dissident slates. A control share bylaw strips or limits the voting rights of any shareholder above a threshold (commonly 10 to 15 per cent). Several Nuveen funds adopted such provisions from 2023 onwards; Saba sued 16 funds in response, and the SDNY ruled in 2024 that certain Nuveen control share provisions are inconsistent with the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Why is this campaign significant for activist investing?
For three reasons. First, it is the first time an activist has treated an entire asset class, rather than individual companies, as a single target, with the same playbook applied to 50-plus funds. Second, it validated the asymmetric pay-off model: Saba lost the proxy votes but still extracted a $1.6bn capital return from BlackRock. Third, the campaign has pulled in both the SEC, which opened a governance review, and the Supreme Court, which heard oral argument in FS Credit Opportunities v. Saba on 10 December 2025 on whether the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides a private right of action. The emergence of Cornerstone, Bulldog Investors and Karpus copycats indicates that the playbook is now a market-standard sub-strategy.
Was this helpful?
Share it with someone
Related Deals
Sources & Notes
- [1]Saba Capital Management corporate website
- [2]Boaz Weinstein vs. Wall Street: The Art of Closed-End Fund Activism, Bocconi Students Investment Club
- [3]BlackRock Innovation & Growth Term Trust DFAN14A and DEFA14A proxy filings, SEC EDGAR (2024)
- [4]BIGZ and BMEZ tender offer settlement announcement, StockTitan (June 2025)
- [5]Saba Capital sues 16 closed-end funds over control share provisions, BusinessWire (June 2023)
- [6]FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund: ICI amicus brief (2025)
- [7]Skadden: Court Upholds Legality of Poison Pills for Closed-End Funds but Limits Successive Plans (April 2025)
- [8]Saba Capital launches campaign at seven UK investment trusts, BusinessWire (December 2024)
- [9]Saba secures Herald Investment Trust liquidity win, BusinessWire (May 2026)
- [10]Saba Capital: A Case Study in Closed-End Fund Activist Motivations, Sodali
- [11]Bloomberg: Boaz Weinstein Reveals What Led Him to JPMorgan's London Whale (September 2022)
- [12]MoneyWeek: Boaz Weinstein, the hedge fund vulture swooping on the City
- [13]Investment Company Act of 1940, SEC regulatory text
- [14]CEF Connect (operated by Nuveen), closed-end fund data