MUST Asset Management × Young Poong — Korean Domestic Activism on the Korea Zinc Parent
Kim Doo-yong's MUST exposes the hypocrisy of Young Poong: demanding governance reform at Korea Zinc while sitting on 6.62% un-cancelled treasury shares for a decade
Background
MUST Asset Management was founded in 2006 as MUST Investment, renamed MUST Investment Advisors in 2010, and became MUST Asset Management in September 2016. Founder and CEO Kim Doo-yong, an architecture graduate of Seoul National University and a first-generation member of the SMIC (SNU Midas Investment Club) stock research group, runs the firm on a value-investing-plus-activism philosophy. AUM peaked around ₩600bn in early 2022 before falling to ₩236bn by early 2023 (a -56% return year), then recovered through the 2024-2025 activism cycle. As of 2026, market estimates place AUM near ₩1.96 trillion (not officially confirmed). MUST's signature playbook: quantitative analysis, public letters, in-person engagement, and formal shareholder proposals if needed.
First Major Campaign — Taeyoung E&C (2014-2020).
MUST began accumulating Taeyoung E&C shares in 2014 and crossed 5% by 2017. In August 2019, MUST changed its filing status from 'passive investment' to 'management participation,' launching Korea's first-generation domestic activist campaign. The campaign pushed Taeyoung toward a holding-company restructuring, non-core asset disposals, and expanded shareholder returns before MUST exited at a profit. MUST resumed buying Taeyoung shares in 2021. The Taeyoung track established that a Korean domestic activist could deliver outcomes through long-cycle engagement rather than headline-grabbing proxy fights.
Second Major Campaign — Young Poong (Nov 2024-).
On Nov 25, 2024, MUST published an open Korean-language position paper titled 'Recommendations on Young Poong's Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance.' On Dec 3, 2024, MUST followed up with an English BusinessWire release: 'MUST Asset Management Launches Activist Campaign on Young Poong Corporation.' The five recommendations: (1) cancel all 6.62% treasury shares and amend the articles of incorporation, (2) implement a 1,000% bonus issue or 10-for-1 stock split, (3) disclose details of the alleged Korea Zinc put option, (4) revalue prime real estate in central Seoul, (5) commit at least 30% of potential put-option cash inflows to shareholder returns. The hypocrisy frame: Young Poong demanded reform at Korea Zinc while leaving its own 6.62% treasury stake (121,906 shares since end-2014) untouched for a decade.
Operational Weakness as Activism Fuel.
MUST's entry was timed to a confluence of Young Poong weaknesses. The Seokpo smelter (Bongwha County) — Young Poong's core zinc operation — was shut down for 58 days from late February to late April 2025 following environmental violations involving unauthorized wastewater discharge, with the operating rate falling below 40% for much of the year. From January 2025, Young Poong could no longer export sulfuric acid byproducts through Korea Zinc's Onsan smelter after environmental authorities suspended Korea Zinc's processing privileges. The result: FY2024 operating loss of roughly ₩160.7bn widened to roughly ₩259.2bn in FY2025 — the third consecutive year of operating losses. Through all of this, Young Poong remained the principal ally of MBK in the 18-month Korea Zinc control battle (Sep 2024 - Apr 2026), absorbing legal costs and management bandwidth that MUST argued should have funded a core-business turnaround.
The Fastest Partial Surrender in Korean Activist History.
Six days after MUST's letter, on Dec 1, 2024, MUST announced that a face-to-face meeting had been scheduled with Young Poong management and that the public campaign would be paused. Sales of 100 treasury shares by President Kang Sung-doo personally telegraphed the change in tone. On Feb 5, 2025, MUST formally filed shareholder proposals for the AGM. On Mar 10, 2025, Young Poong's board resolved to cancel all 6.62% treasury shares by March 2026, execute a 10-for-1 stock split (par value ₩5,000 to ₩500), and accept MUST's nominee Jeon Young-jun (a shareholder-rights attorney) as an outside director candidate. The stock jumped roughly 13% on the announcement. At the March 27, 2025 AGM, all of these resolutions passed.
Residual Demands and Current Status.
The treasury cancellation and stock split are in execution. But MUST's three other demands — Korea Zinc put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, and the 30%+ cash-return commitment — remain unaddressed by Young Poong's board. The picture shifted again in December 2025, when Korea Zinc's Crucible JV new-share issuance and the April 2, 2026 Supreme Court ruling upholding Young Poong's vote restriction effectively closed the control battle. Young Poong's Korea Zinc put-option value entered a re-evaluation phase, repositioning MUST's 30%+ cash-return demand as the next negotiating frontier. Market participants believe MUST has maintained its position and is engaged with the company on the residual agenda (not officially confirmed).
Deal Summary
- Deal Value
- Young Poong mkt cap ~₩600-750bn / Treasury cancellation 6.62% + 10:1 split
- Acquirer
- MUST Asset Management (Kim Doo-yong, ~2% holder)
- Target
- Young Poong Corp (KOSPI 005670)
- Announced
- Nov 25, 2024 (first open letter)
- Closed
- Mar 27, 2025 AGM (partial win); residual demands open
- Country
- South Korea
Executive Summary
- [MUST Asset Management] Founded 2006 as MUST Investment; renamed MUST Asset Management in September 2016. CEO Kim Doo-yong (SNU architecture, SMIC alum) runs a value-plus-activism strategy. AUM ~₩236bn (early 2023) recovering to an estimated ~₩1.96 trillion in 2026 (market estimate, not officially confirmed). Track record: Taeyoung E&C (2014-2020) → Young Poong (Nov 2024-).
- [Target — Young Poong Corp (005670)] Founded 1949 by the Choi (Korea Zinc) and Jang (Young Poong) families. Listed on KOSPI; market cap ~₩600-750bn. Zinc smelter (Seokpo) plus electronic components. Holds ~25.42% of Korea Zinc and was the principal attacker alongside MBK in the 18-month Korea Zinc control battle (Sep 2024 - Apr 2026).
- [Campaign Launch — Nov 25, 2024] MUST (~2% stake) published an open position paper, followed by a BusinessWire English release on Dec 3, 2024. Five demands: (1) cancel all 6.62% treasury shares, (2) 1,000% bonus issue or 10:1 split, (3) disclose Korea Zinc put option, (4) revalue Seoul prime real estate, (5) commit 30%+ of put-option cash inflows to shareholder returns.
- [Core Narrative — Hypocrisy Exposure] MUST contrasted Young Poong President Kang Sung-doo's September 2024 statement that 'treasury shares not acquired for cancellation should not be acquired at all — they don't serve shareholders' with Young Poong's own decade-long failure to cancel its 6.62% treasury stake (121,906 shares since end-2014).
- [Operational Weakness] Seokpo smelter shut for 58 days in 2025 over environmental violations; utilization below 40%; sulfuric acid exports blocked from January 2025. FY2024 operating loss ~₩160.7bn widened to ~₩259.2bn in FY2025 — third consecutive year of operating losses.
- [Fastest Partial Surrender in Korean Activist History] Six days from letter to face-to-face meeting; 3.5 months from letter to board resolution. On Mar 10, 2025 Young Poong's board resolved to cancel all treasury shares by March 2026, execute a 10:1 split, and accept MUST's outside-director nominee Jeon Young-jun. Stock +13% on announcement.
- [Residual Demands] Put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, and the 30%+ cash-return commitment remained unaddressed as of June 2026. The April 2, 2026 Supreme Court ruling closing the Korea Zinc dispute reset the put-option's value, repositioning MUST's residual agenda for the next negotiating phase.
- [Strategic Significance] The first Korean domestic activist campaign to target the weaker affiliate inside a live, top-tier control battle. After Align's 2023 financial-holdings campaign, MUST's Young Poong campaign extended the playbook into chaebol affiliate disputes — likely to become a template for future Korean activism wave 2024-2026 cases.
Industry Overview
Korea's non-ferrous smelting industry is dominated by Korea Zinc (world #1 in zinc, ~10% global share) and Young Poong (Korea's #2). The two were co-founded in 1949 by the Choi and Jang families and ran as a dual-family partnership for seven decades. Young Poong holds ~25.42% of Korea Zinc as its largest shareholder. The dual-family arrangement broke down after Yun-bum Choi took over Korea Zinc in 2022 and pushed an aggressive 'Troika Drive' investment program in EV materials, hydrogen and solar. In September 2024, the partnership collapsed into Korea's largest-ever control battle (MBK Partners + Young Poong vs. Chairman Choi). Young Poong's own zinc business has been deteriorating in parallel: tighter environmental regulation (wastewater, sulfuric acid byproducts), Chinese capacity expansion compressing global zinc prices, and operating inefficiency at the Seokpo smelter have driven three consecutive years of operating losses. MUST's activism entry hit at the moment when all three Young Poong weaknesses — operational, governance, and dispute-related resource drain — were simultaneously exposed.
Young Poong market cap (Nov 2024)
~₩600-700bn
Under ₩1 trillion
Treasury share holding
6.62%
121,906 shares since end-2014, never cancelled
Korea Zinc stake held by YP
~25.42%
Central battlefield asset
FY2025 operating loss
~₩259.2bn
3rd consecutive loss year; FY2024 was ~₩160.7bn
The Korean activism wave 2022-2026 has been driven by Align Partners (SM Entertainment 2022 → 7 financial holdings 2023 → Coway 2025), KCGI (Hanjin KAL 2018-2022 → Hyundai Elevator and Osstem Implant 2023-), Trustone (BYC and Taekwang Industrial 2022-), MUST (Taeyoung E&C 2014-2020 → Young Poong 2024-), and VIP Asset Management. Total campaigns surged from 9 in 2021 to 70+ in 2024 — roughly 8x growth. MUST's Young Poong campaign is the first to target the weaker affiliate inside a live, top-tier control battle, opening a new template for chaebol-affiliate activism.
Key Players
Company Overview: Young Poong Corp (KOSPI 005670)
Young Poong is Korea's first non-ferrous smelting company, founded in 1949 by Choi Ki-ho and Jang Byeong-hee. Its core assets are the Seokpo zinc and lead smelter (operational since the 1970s) in Bongwha County, an electronics components business, and — most importantly for activists — a ~25.42% stake in Korea Zinc. Listed on KOSPI (005670) with market cap of roughly ₩600-750bn through 2024-2025, Young Poong is worth a small fraction of the assets it holds. Its core smelting business has posted operating losses for three consecutive years (FY2023 through FY2025), pressured by environmental compliance costs, Chinese zinc capacity expansion, and Seokpo operational inefficiency. In September 2024, Young Poong joined MBK Partners to launch a hostile tender offer on Korea Zinc — an 18-month battle that ended with the Supreme Court ruling on April 2, 2026 upholding Young Poong's vote restriction. Throughout, Young Poong held 6.62% of its own shares as treasury (121,906 shares since end-2014) without cancelling a single one — the central governance issue MUST targeted.
Founded
1949
Choi Ki-ho and Jang Byeong-hee co-founded
Core business
Zinc smelting + electronics
Seokpo smelter, Bongwha County
KOSPI ticker
005670
Mkt cap ~₩600-750bn
Korea Zinc stake
~25.42%
Largest shareholder; Korea Zinc battle attacker
Treasury shares
6.62%
Never cancelled in 10 years
Seokpo utilization 2025
Below 40%
58-day environmental shutdown
Control Battle Overview
MUST's Young Poong campaign is not a standard activism case — it is the side-front of Korea's largest-ever control battle. While Korea Zinc and the MBK-Young Poong coalition fought the main battle (Sep 2024 - Apr 2026), MUST identified the moment when Young Poong itself was operationally weakest (loss-making Seokpo smelter, three years of red ink) and most rhetorically exposed (President Kang's September 2024 criticism of Korea Zinc's treasury policy while Young Poong held 6.62% un-cancelled for a decade). The campaign closed the main rhetorical loop within 3.5 months — the fastest partial surrender in Korean activist history. This section maps the moves on both sides.
The trigger was Young Poong President Kang Sung-doo's September 2024 press conference, where he attacked Korea Zinc's treasury share policy: 'Treasury shares not acquired for cancellation should not be acquired at all — they don't serve shareholders.' MUST seized on the contradiction with Young Poong's own behavior: 121,906 treasury shares (6.62%) held since end-2014, never cancelled. Combined with Young Poong's three-year operating-loss streak, its environmental shutdowns, and its bandwidth absorbed by the Korea Zinc battle, the timing made the moral and quantitative case unanswerable.
📈 Price Impact
The stock traded around ₩380,000 before the campaign, jumped roughly 13% on the Mar 10, 2025 announcement (reaching the high-₩500K range), then settled around ₩480,000 by mid-2026 as the Korea Zinc battle closed and the put-option value entered re-evaluation. Operating losses (FY2025 ~₩259.2bn) cap the upside; the active treasury cancellation and put-option agenda support the downside. After the March 2026 10:1 split takes effect, the price will need to be restated on the ₩500 par basis (market view).
🗡️ Battle Timeline
[Self-contradiction set-up] Press-conference attack on Korea Zinc's treasury policy
At a September 2024 press conference, President Kang criticized Korea Zinc's defensive buyback: 'Treasury shares not acquired for cancellation should not be acquired at all — they don't serve shareholders.' Young Poong itself held 121,906 treasury shares (6.62%) since end-2014, with no cancellations. MUST later used this directly as the campaign's central rhetorical hook.
[Campaign launch] First open letter to Young Poong — five demands
MUST published an open Korean position paper titled 'Recommendations on Young Poong's Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance.' Five demands: (1) cancel all 6.62% treasury shares plus articles amendment, (2) 1,000% bonus issue or 10-for-1 split, (3) disclose the alleged Korea Zinc put option held via the MBK-Young Poong consortium, (4) revalue prime Seoul real estate, (5) commit 30%+ of any put-option cash inflows to shareholder returns. The core message exposed Young Poong's hypocrisy in demanding Korea Zinc governance reform while leaving its own treasury stack untouched for ten years.
BusinessWire English release — global market signal
MUST issued an English BusinessWire release ('MUST Asset Management Launches Activist Campaign on Young Poong Corporation') picked up immediately by KED Global, Bloomberg, Hedgeweek and Smartkarma. Bloomberg published 'Hedge Fund Returning 50% Calls Out Korean Corporate Hypocrisy' on Dec 23, 2024, positioning the campaign in the global hedge-fund context and amplifying MUST's profile.
Direct meeting scheduled — public campaign paused
MUST announced that a face-to-face meeting had been scheduled with Young Poong management and that 'we will pause the activist campaign through the meeting and do our best to extract substantive outcomes.' President Kang separately bought 100 treasury shares for his own account as a signal of alignment. The fastest direct engagement settlement in Korean activist history — Young Poong, in the middle of the Korea Zinc battle, had every incentive to close the side-front quickly.
Formal shareholder proposal filed for AGM
After concluding that the December meeting had not produced sufficient results, MUST formally filed shareholder proposals for Young Poong's AGM: full treasury cancellation, stock split or bonus issue, and a director nomination (Jeon Young-jun, a shareholder-rights attorney). This completed MUST's three-step pressure ladder: public letter → direct engagement → formal proposal.
[Partial surrender] Board resolves to cancel treasury shares, 10:1 split, and accept MUST nominee
Young Poong's board resolved to cancel all 6.62% treasury shares by March 2026, execute a 10-for-1 stock split (par ₩5,000 to ₩500), and recommend MUST's nominee Jeon Young-jun for an outside director seat. The fastest such concession in Korean activist history (3.5 months from open letter). Separate proposals from minority holder Young Poong Precision — in-kind dividends, cumulative voting, audit-committee director — were also added to the AGM agenda. Stock +13% on announcement.
AGM passes all key resolutions
Young Poong's AGM approved treasury cancellation, 10:1 split, and Jeon Young-jun's election as outside director. MUST publicly indicated it had withdrawn some of its sharper demands ahead of the meeting in light of the board's concessions, but Young Poong kept the Jeon nomination on the slate.
[Round 2 of the main battle: U.S. white knight emerges]
Korea Zinc issued ₩2.85 trillion of new shares to the U.S. DoD/DoC-backed Crucible JV and announced an ₩11 trillion smelter in Tennessee. Young Poong and MBK filed an injunction to block. The alleged Korea Zinc put option — central to MUST's demand #3 — entered a re-evaluation phase, making MUST's residual agenda dependent on how the main battle resolved.
Supreme Court upholds Young Poong vote restriction — Korea Zinc battle closes
The Supreme Court dismissed Young Poong and MBK's final appeal, confirming the legality of the cross-shareholding mechanism that disenfranchised Young Poong's Korea Zinc votes. The 18-month battle effectively ended. Young Poong's put-option cash-flow timing and magnitude entered a restructuring phase, opening — but also complicating — MUST's residual demand #5 (30%+ cash return).
[Current status] Position maintained; residual agenda under negotiation
As of June 2026, market participants believe MUST has maintained its Young Poong stake and is engaged with the company on the residual demands (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, 30%+ cash return) — though some demands may have been withdrawn (not officially confirmed). With the Korea Zinc battle closed, Young Poong's incentive to settle the side-front quickly has diminished, lengthening the negotiating timeline.
[Self-contradiction set-up] Press-conference attack on Korea Zinc's treasury policy
At a September 2024 press conference, President Kang criticized Korea Zinc's defensive buyback: 'Treasury shares not acquired for cancellation should not be acquired at all — they don't serve shareholders.' Young Poong itself held 121,906 treasury shares (6.62%) since end-2014, with no cancellations. MUST later used this directly as the campaign's central rhetorical hook.
[Campaign launch] First open letter to Young Poong — five demands
MUST published an open Korean position paper titled 'Recommendations on Young Poong's Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance.' Five demands: (1) cancel all 6.62% treasury shares plus articles amendment, (2) 1,000% bonus issue or 10-for-1 split, (3) disclose the alleged Korea Zinc put option held via the MBK-Young Poong consortium, (4) revalue prime Seoul real estate, (5) commit 30%+ of any put-option cash inflows to shareholder returns. The core message exposed Young Poong's hypocrisy in demanding Korea Zinc governance reform while leaving its own treasury stack untouched for ten years.
BusinessWire English release — global market signal
MUST issued an English BusinessWire release ('MUST Asset Management Launches Activist Campaign on Young Poong Corporation') picked up immediately by KED Global, Bloomberg, Hedgeweek and Smartkarma. Bloomberg published 'Hedge Fund Returning 50% Calls Out Korean Corporate Hypocrisy' on Dec 23, 2024, positioning the campaign in the global hedge-fund context and amplifying MUST's profile.
Direct meeting scheduled — public campaign paused
MUST announced that a face-to-face meeting had been scheduled with Young Poong management and that 'we will pause the activist campaign through the meeting and do our best to extract substantive outcomes.' President Kang separately bought 100 treasury shares for his own account as a signal of alignment. The fastest direct engagement settlement in Korean activist history — Young Poong, in the middle of the Korea Zinc battle, had every incentive to close the side-front quickly.
Formal shareholder proposal filed for AGM
After concluding that the December meeting had not produced sufficient results, MUST formally filed shareholder proposals for Young Poong's AGM: full treasury cancellation, stock split or bonus issue, and a director nomination (Jeon Young-jun, a shareholder-rights attorney). This completed MUST's three-step pressure ladder: public letter → direct engagement → formal proposal.
[Partial surrender] Board resolves to cancel treasury shares, 10:1 split, and accept MUST nominee
Young Poong's board resolved to cancel all 6.62% treasury shares by March 2026, execute a 10-for-1 stock split (par ₩5,000 to ₩500), and recommend MUST's nominee Jeon Young-jun for an outside director seat. The fastest such concession in Korean activist history (3.5 months from open letter). Separate proposals from minority holder Young Poong Precision — in-kind dividends, cumulative voting, audit-committee director — were also added to the AGM agenda. Stock +13% on announcement.
AGM passes all key resolutions
Young Poong's AGM approved treasury cancellation, 10:1 split, and Jeon Young-jun's election as outside director. MUST publicly indicated it had withdrawn some of its sharper demands ahead of the meeting in light of the board's concessions, but Young Poong kept the Jeon nomination on the slate.
[Round 2 of the main battle: U.S. white knight emerges]
Korea Zinc issued ₩2.85 trillion of new shares to the U.S. DoD/DoC-backed Crucible JV and announced an ₩11 trillion smelter in Tennessee. Young Poong and MBK filed an injunction to block. The alleged Korea Zinc put option — central to MUST's demand #3 — entered a re-evaluation phase, making MUST's residual agenda dependent on how the main battle resolved.
Supreme Court upholds Young Poong vote restriction — Korea Zinc battle closes
The Supreme Court dismissed Young Poong and MBK's final appeal, confirming the legality of the cross-shareholding mechanism that disenfranchised Young Poong's Korea Zinc votes. The 18-month battle effectively ended. Young Poong's put-option cash-flow timing and magnitude entered a restructuring phase, opening — but also complicating — MUST's residual demand #5 (30%+ cash return).
[Current status] Position maintained; residual agenda under negotiation
As of June 2026, market participants believe MUST has maintained its Young Poong stake and is engaged with the company on the residual demands (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, 30%+ cash return) — though some demands may have been withdrawn (not officially confirmed). With the Korea Zinc battle closed, Young Poong's incentive to settle the side-front quickly has diminished, lengthening the negotiating timeline.
🔩 Key Instruments
⚔️ Offense Playbook— MUST Asset Management + Kim Doo-yong
The Nov 25, 2024 Korean position paper plus the Dec 3, 2024 BusinessWire English release. Combined quantitative analysis (6.62% treasury × 10 years uncancelled) with five concrete demands and a global PR push — MUST's signature playbook.
MUST framed Young Poong's stance using its own September 2024 statement against Korea Zinc's treasury policy. The mirror strategy — applying Young Poong's stated standard back to Young Poong itself — captured both media attention and moral high ground simultaneously.
Demand that Young Poong disclose terms of the alleged Korea Zinc put option held via the MBK-Young Poong consortium. The demand intervenes directly in the main battle's pricing mechanics, putting both sides under pressure. Unresolved as of June 2026.
Formal Feb 5, 2025 AGM filing covering treasury cancellation, stock split, and the nomination of Jeon Young-jun as outside director. Young Poong accepted the director nomination outright, giving MUST its first board-level beachhead.
BusinessWire English release plus pickups by KED Global, Bloomberg, Hedgeweek, Smartkarma and Korea Herald. The Bloomberg 'Hedge Fund Returning 50% Calls Out Korean Corporate Hypocrisy' piece anchored MUST's profile in the global hedge-fund community.
🛡️ Defense Playbook— Young Poong management + Korea Zinc-MBK coalition
Face-to-face meeting scheduled within six days of the letter; President Kang's personal treasury purchase; Mar 10, 2025 board resolutions on the three governance demands. Young Poong accepted the demands with low strategic impact (treasury, split, director) and deflected the demands tied to the Korea Zinc battle (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, cash return).
By placing MUST proposals alongside Young Poong Precision's separate proposals (in-kind dividends, cumulative voting) and management's own slate, the board diluted MUST's standalone visibility and turned the AGM into a consensual settlement rather than a proxy fight.
Turning Point
2025-03-10Young Poong board resolves on treasury cancellation, 10:1 split, and MUST-nominated director
The decisive moment was Young Poong's board resolution of Mar 10, 2025 — 3.5 months from MUST's open letter and roughly five weeks from the formal shareholder proposal. The board accepted three of MUST's five demands in a single resolution: cancel all 6.62% treasury shares by March 2026, execute a 10-for-1 stock split, and recommend Jeon Young-jun as outside director. With the Korea Zinc battle still active, Young Poong chose to close the side-front decisively rather than absorb a multi-month proxy fight. The +13% stock reaction reflected the market's read. Following this case, the Korean activism wave gained a template for entering weaker chaebol affiliates during live control battles.
Final Verdict
Attacker WinsMUST Asset Management — Partial Win (3 of 5 demands secured; residual agenda open)
Margin: 3/5 demands secured (treasury cancellation, split, director nomination); 2 demands open (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, 30%+ cash return)
MUST secured the treasury cancellation, the 10:1 split, and the outside director nomination through the Mar 10, 2025 board resolution and the Mar 27, 2025 AGM. The put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, and 30%+ cash return demands remained unresolved as of June 2026 — though the April 2, 2026 Supreme Court closure of the Korea Zinc battle opened a put-option re-evaluation window that repositions MUST's residual agenda. Some demands may have been withdrawn (not officially confirmed). Clear partial win in the headline category (the fastest such surrender after Align's 2023 financial-holdings sweep); residual agenda remains in play.
Deal Structure
This is an activism-and-governance campaign rather than an M&A transaction. Pre-campaign ownership of Young Poong: the Jang family and affiliates ~62%, Korea Zinc ~1.85%, MUST ~2%, treasury ~6.62%, public ~27%. Post-campaign changes: treasury 6.62% to be fully cancelled by March 2026; par value to drop from ₩5,000 to ₩500 (10:1 split); MUST-nominated outside director (Jeon Young-jun, attorney) added to the board. The put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, and 30%+ cash-return demands remain unimplemented.
Pre-Deal
Jang Family
Largest holder + relatives ~62%
Young Poong
KOSPI 005670
Korea Zinc
Cross-holding ~1.85%
MUST Asset Mgmt
~2% (campaign start)
YP Treasury
6.62% (uncancelled 10 yrs)
Public Holders
~27%
Post-Deal
Jang Family
~66% (after treasury cancellation)
Young Poong
Treasury cancellation + 10:1 split
Korea Zinc
~2% (post-dispute)
MUST Asset Mgmt
~2-3% (position maintained)
Public Holders
~29% (after treasury cancellation)
Jeon Young-jun, Director
MUST nominee, elected Mar 2025
Key Terms
Advisors
This is an activism campaign rather than an M&A deal, so the advisor structure follows activist conventions. The attacker side is led by MUST's in-house team with limited external support. The defender side relies on Young Poong's board counsel and on the Korean law firm and global IB advisors already in place for the Korea Zinc battle (some assignments are market estimates rather than officially disclosed).
Attacker (MUST Asset Management) Advisors
MUST Asset Management (in-house team)
Activism analysis and campaign leadLed by CEO Kim Doo-yong (Seoul National University, SMIC alum). The in-house team built the quantitative case combining the 6.62% treasury overhang, three-year operating-loss trajectory, and Korea Zinc put-option value — MUST's signature first-generation domestic activism analytical frame.
BusinessWire (global PR channel)
Global PR distributionDec 3, 2024 'MUST Asset Management Launches Activist Campaign on Young Poong Corporation' English release. Delivered the campaign directly into the global hedge-fund community.
Jeon Young-jun (outside director nominee)
Shareholder-rights attorneyMUST's nominee for Young Poong's outside director seat. Specializes in shareholder-rights law. Approved by the Young Poong board March 2025; elected at the Mar 27, 2025 AGM. The personnel embodiment of MUST's governance gains.
External legal / financial advisors (informal)
Informal advisoryMUST has not disclosed formal external IB or law-firm engagements. The market view is an 'in-house + informal external' structure (not officially confirmed).
Defender (Young Poong board) Advisors
Kim & Chang
Legal advisor (in parallel with Korea Zinc battle)Kim & Chang represented Young Poong and MBK in the Korea Zinc battle and is widely believed to have also handled the response to the MUST activism campaign (not officially confirmed) — drafting rejection rationales, vetting director nominees, and handling AGM procedures.
Citigroup
Financial advisor (in parallel with Korea Zinc battle)Citigroup advised Young Poong/MBK during the Korea Zinc tender offer and is believed to have provided ancillary support on the MUST response (not officially confirmed) — modeling the treasury-cancellation and stock-split impact on capital structure.
Samjong KPMG / EY Hanyoung (potential real estate revaluation advisors)
Accounting / valuation (potential)Logical candidates if Young Poong decides to address MUST's real-estate revaluation demand. As of June 2026, no formal real-estate revaluation has been announced and no engagement is confirmed.
Note: Advisor information is based on public sources, press reporting, and market observation. As is common in activism cases, some assignments are not officially disclosed and are labeled as 'market view' here.
Financials
Unit: ₩100m (KRW hundred millions) | K-IFRS consolidated | Source: Young Poong annual reports, UPI, Korea Herald (FY2024-FY2025). Three consecutive years of operating losses (FY2023-FY2025). FY2025 widening reflects the 58-day Seokpo shutdown, sulfuric acid export blockage, and additional environmental capex. Some figures are estimates, marked with 'approx.'
| Item | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ₩ 13,700100m | ₩ 13,200100m | ₩ 15,300100m | ₩ 16,200100m | ₩ 14,200100m | ₩ 12,500100m | ₩ 11,000100m |
| COGS | ₩ 12,900100m | ₩ 12,500100m | ₩ 13,800100m | ₩ 14,900100m | ₩ 13,800100m | ₩ 12,700100m | ₩ 11,400100m |
| Gross Profit | ₩ 800100m | ₩ 700100m | ₩ 1,500100m | ₩ 1,300100m | ₩ 400100m | ₩ -200100m | ₩ -400100m |
| SG&A | ₩ 900100m | ₩ 900100m | ₩ 1,000100m | ₩ 1,100100m | ₩ 1,100100m | ₩ 1,400100m | ₩ 1,900100m |
| Operating Income | ₩ -100100m | ₩ -200100m | ₩ 500100m | ₩ 200100m | ₩ -700100m | ₩ -1,607100m | ₩ -2,592100m |
| EBITDA | ₩ 600100m | ₩ 500100m | ₩ 1,200100m | ₩ 900100m | ₩ 100100m | ₩ -800100m | ₩ -1,700100m |
| EBITDA Margin | 4.4% | 3.8% | 7.8% | 5.6% | 0.7% | -6.4% | -15.5% |
Valuation
The core valuation argument is that Young Poong's market cap of ~₩600-750bn dramatically understates a sum-of-parts NAV that includes the Korea Zinc stake, the treasury shares, prime Seoul real estate, and the (loss-making but asset-rich) core smelting business. Young Poong's ~25.42% Korea Zinc stake alone is worth roughly ₩2.5-3 trillion at battle-era Korea Zinc valuations (₩10.5-12 trillion mkt cap) — three to five times Young Poong's entire market cap. MUST's five demands are a sequenced decomposition of that NAV-discount unlock: cancel the treasury, split for liquidity, disclose the put option to crystallize the Korea Zinc claim, revalue the real estate, and commit a share of the put-option inflows to shareholders.
| Metric | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Young Poong market cap (Nov 2024, pre-campaign) | ~₩600-700bn | PBR ~0.3x, large NAV discount |
| Treasury stake | 6.62% (121,906 sh) | Untouched for 10 years |
| Korea Zinc stake held by Young Poong | ~25.42% | Mkt value ~₩2.5-3T (Korea Zinc mkt cap ~₩10.5-12T) |
| Korea Zinc put option (alleged, held by YP) | Not disclosed | Central to MUST demand #3 |
| Prime Seoul real estate | Not revalued | Book vs market gap — MUST demand #4 |
| FY2024 operating loss | ~₩160.7bn | Core business deteriorating; 3-year loss streak begins |
| FY2025 operating loss | ~₩259.2bn | Seokpo 58-day shutdown + sulfuric acid export blockage |
| Stock (Nov 2024, pre-campaign) | ~₩380,000 | On ₩5,000 par basis |
| Stock (Mar 10, 2025 board resolution day) | +13% to ~₩580,000 | Reaction to treasury cancellation + split announcement |
| Stock (June 2026) | ~₩480,000 | Post-Korea Zinc closure, operating losses cap upside |
| Treasury cancellation unlock (6.62%) | ~₩40-50bn return effect | Share count down → per-share metrics up |
| Residual demand unlock (30%+ put-option return) | Several hundred bn to trillion-range potential | Subject to put-option valuation (market view, not confirmed) |
Note: Market caps, share prices, and NAV figures are based on public disclosures, press reporting, and market observation. Estimates are marked 'approx.' or 'market view'; the Korea Zinc put-option value cannot be precisely modeled given the non-public contract.
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Deal Rationale
Why MUST picked Young Poong — targeting the weaker affiliate in a live battle
- [Entering the Korea Zinc battle's side-front] Young Poong's three simultaneous weaknesses — operational decline (Seokpo losses), governance overhang (6.62% uncancelled treasury), and Korea Zinc-battle resource drain — created an unprotected flank. While the main battle absorbed Korea Zinc and MBK's attention, Young Poong itself was exposed.
- [Hypocrisy narrative as moral lever] President Kang's September 2024 attack on Korea Zinc's treasury policy contradicted Young Poong's own decade-long treasury inaction. MUST framed this as applying Young Poong's own standard back to itself — a mirror strategy that won media and minority-holder support simultaneously.
- [Quantitative simplicity] Young Poong's NAV (Korea Zinc stake + treasury + real estate + core operations) is three to five times its market cap. That gap is undeniable, and each of MUST's five demands decomposes a piece of the unlock — concrete, not abstract.
- [Put-option disclosure as battle intervention] Demand #3 (disclose the Korea Zinc put option) reaches into the pricing mechanics of the main battle. Disclosure would expose both sides to public scrutiny — making the demand a strategic lever beyond standard activism.
- [Capital-efficient ROI] Three of five demands secured in 3.5 months — among the highest ROI a Korean activist has produced. MUST timed entry to Young Poong's strongest incentive to settle the side-front, and reserved the harder demands (put option, real estate) for the post-battle phase.
Why Young Poong surrendered quickly — concentrating resources on the main front
- [Resource concentration on the main battle] In November 2024, Young Poong was in the middle of the 18-month Korea Zinc battle. There was no bandwidth to fight a multi-month proxy battle on the side-front. The priority was: settle MUST's governance demands quickly, concentrate everything else on the main fight.
- [The hypocrisy narrative was indefensible] Treasury 6.62% × 10 years is a fact, not an opinion — and Kang's own September 2024 statement was on the record. Dragging out the fight would only deepen the moral damage. Fast concession protected the brand.
- [Selective concession was available] Three of MUST's five demands (treasury, split, director) had limited spillover into the Korea Zinc battle. The other two (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation) touched the main front directly. Young Poong's defense was textbook: concede the safe demands fast, defer the dangerous ones.
- [President Kang's personal treasury purchase] Buying 100 treasury shares for his own account signaled alignment with management's stated turnaround intent — building trust before the MUST meeting and showing the market the board took the issue seriously.
- [Avoiding a proxy fight] The board's Mar 10 resolutions pre-empted the formal AGM proposals filed Feb 5. The framing — 'the board's own decision to improve governance' — was more palatable politically than 'forced concession to an activist.'
Post-Deal Assessment (June 2026 as of)
MUST's Young Poong campaign secured the fastest partial surrender in Korean activist history in March 2025 — treasury cancellation, 10:1 split, and a board seat through nominee Jeon Young-jun. As of June 2026, the campaign sits in an open-ended phase: the residual demands (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, 30%+ cash return) remain unaddressed, while the April 2, 2026 Supreme Court ruling closing the Korea Zinc battle opened a put-option re-evaluation window that repositions MUST's leverage. In the broader 2022-2026 Korean activism wave, MUST's campaign extended the playbook beyond banking-sector dividend activism (Align 2023) into chaebol-affiliate disputes — making the case that domestic activists can target the weaker side of a live, top-tier control battle. The Young Poong template is likely to be replicated in future cases.
Positives
- [Fastest partial surrender in Korean activist history] Open letter Nov 25, 2024 → direct meeting Dec 1, 2024 → formal proposal Feb 5, 2025 → board resolution Mar 10, 2025 → AGM passage Mar 27, 2025. ~4 months from letter to executed concessions — second only to Align's 2023 financial-holdings sweep.
- [Full treasury cancellation secured] 6.62% (121,906 shares) untouched since end-2014, now to be fully cancelled by March 2026. Roughly 7% reduction in share count, lifting per-share metrics and the public-float ratio. The first time a Korean activist broke a decade-old uncancelled treasury position.
- [10:1 split executed] Par value from ₩5,000 to ₩500, easing retail accessibility and resolving Young Poong's chronic liquidity shortage.
- [MUST-nominated director seated] Jeon Young-jun (shareholder-rights attorney) elected to Young Poong's board — only the second time after Align's two JB Financial directors (2024) that a Korean activist has placed a nominee on a chaebol-affiliate board.
- [Korea Zinc put-option agenda elevated] MUST's demand for put-option disclosure entered the Korea Zinc battle as a public variable. With the battle closed in April 2026, the put-option re-evaluation window strengthens MUST's leverage on the residual cash-return demand.
- [Korean activism wave template established] Following Align's 2023 banking sweep, MUST's Young Poong case proves that domestic activism can target weaker affiliates inside live control battles. Likely to become a reference model.
Risks & Concerns
- [Residual demands unresolved] Put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, and the 30%+ cash-return commitment remain open as of June 2026. Some demands may have been withdrawn (not officially confirmed). The campaign cannot be called a full win until at least the cash-return demand crystallizes.
- [Core-business losses continue] FY2025 operating loss ~₩259.2bn (third consecutive year), Seokpo utilization below 40%, sulfuric acid exports blocked. Governance improvements without an operational turnaround cap the stock's upside.
- [Put-option value re-evaluation risk] With the Korea Zinc battle closed by the April 2, 2026 Supreme Court ruling, the timing and magnitude of Young Poong's Korea Zinc put-option cash flows may be restructured — moving the goalposts on MUST's 30%+ cash-return demand.
- [Single-fund concentration risk] AUM ~₩1.96 trillion (market estimate), heavily dependent on Kim Doo-yong personally for analytical and media execution. Sustainability of next-phase negotiation bandwidth carries a question mark.
- [No legal cards played] MUST has not used injunctions or litigation at any point in the campaign. If the residual negotiation stalls, the available remaining weapons are limited.
- [Post-battle incentive shift at Young Poong] With the main battle closed, Young Poong no longer has a strong incentive to settle the side-front quickly. The defender's motivation to concede further has weakened relative to the campaign's first phase.
This announcement appears as a matter of record only
MUST Asset Management (Kim Doo-yong)
Acquirer
Young Poong Corp (005670)
Target
MUST × Young Poong — Korean Domestic Activism on the Korea Zinc Parent
Transaction Size
Young Poong mkt cap ~₩600-750bn, treasury 6.62% cancellation + 10:1 split
Target mkt cap ~USD 500m, treasury cancellation + 10:1 split
EV / EBITDA
N/A (Activism Campaign)
Multiple
Closed
Mar 2025 (Partial Win) — Ongoing for residual demands
Deal Date
Editor's Note
The real significance is not that MUST extracted a treasury cancellation from Young Poong — it is that the campaign proved Korean domestic activists can target the weaker side of a live, top-tier control battle. The Korea Zinc-MBK fight was Korea's largest-ever M&A confrontation; MUST's Young Poong campaign opened a side-front and demonstrated that the Korean activism wave can find new ground in affiliate-level disputes. The multi-layer thesis — combining decade-old governance failings, ongoing operational losses, dispute-related resource drain, and embedded put-option value — sets a new analytical bar for Korean activism. As of June 2026, the residual demands (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, 30%+ cash return) remain in play, and the post-battle put-option re-evaluation will decide how far MUST can push the next phase. Some details remain at the market-observation level and have not been officially confirmed.
Key Concepts in This Deal
The simultaneous emergence of Korean domestic activist campaigns across 2022-2026, led by Align Partners (2022-), KCGI (2018-), Trustone (2022-), MUST (2014-), and VIP Asset Management. Annual campaigns surged from 9 in 2021 to 70+ in 2024. MUST's Young Poong campaign sits inside this wave.
An activism model demanding not just treasury share holding but full cancellation plus articles amendment to prevent re-issuance. Treasury cancellation reduces share count, lifting per-share metrics and automatically raising the controlling shareholder's stake. MUST's Young Poong campaign targeted a 10-year uncancelled position.
Activism that enters the weaker affiliate inside a live top-tier control battle. The Korea Zinc-MBK 18-month dispute was the main front; MUST's Young Poong campaign was the side-front. During a live battle, the weaker affiliate has limited resources to fight a multi-front campaign — creating high incentive to settle the side-front quickly.
First-generation Korean domestic activist. SNU architecture graduate and SMIC alum. Founded MUST Investment in 2006, renamed MUST Asset Management in September 2016. Track record: Taeyoung E&C (2014-2020) → Young Poong (2024-). Value investing plus activism, with quantitative analysis and direct engagement as the signature playbook.
MUST's central analytical frame: Young Poong management diverted resources from a needed Seokpo turnaround to the Korea Zinc battle, damaging minority shareholders. The three-consecutive-year operating loss, the environmental shutdowns, and the sulfuric acid blockage anchor the thesis. The corollary: treasury cancellation and put-option cash returns should redirect spare capital back into the core business.
MUST's demand that Young Poong disclose the alleged Korea Zinc put option held via the MBK-Young Poong consortium — exercise price, maturity, terms. Disclosure would expose the dispute's underlying pricing mechanics to public scrutiny. The demand made activism a direct lever on the main battle.
The way conflicts among chaebol affiliates transfer costs onto minority shareholders rather than principal disputing parties. Young Poong concentrated bandwidth on the Korea Zinc battle while letting the core business deteriorate and the 6.62% treasury stagnate — directly hurting minorities. MUST framed this transfer as the moral foundation of the campaign.
The industrialization phase of Korean activism following Align's 7-financial-holdings sweep (2023) and the launch of the government's Corporate Value-Up Program (Feb 2024). MUST's Young Poong campaign (Nov 2024) joined with Align's Coway campaign (2025) and follow-on KCGI/Trustone campaigns to expand the agenda from individual companies to sectors to policy to chaebol-affiliate disputes.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who are MUST Asset Management and Kim Doo-yong?
MUST Asset Management is a Seoul-based long-only fund that began as MUST Investment in 2006, became MUST Investment Advisors in 2010, and adopted its current name in September 2016. Kim Doo-yong, the founder and CEO, is an architecture graduate of Seoul National University and a first-generation SMIC (SNU Midas Investment Club) alum. He has run MUST's investment process since inception, combining value investing with activism. AUM peaked near ₩600bn in early 2022, fell to ₩236bn by early 2023 (a -56% return year), and is now estimated near ₩1.96 trillion in 2026 (market estimate, not officially confirmed).
What were MUST's five demands and how many were met?
(1) Cancel all 6.62% treasury shares plus articles amendment; (2) 1,000% bonus issue or 10-for-1 stock split; (3) disclose the alleged Korea Zinc put option; (4) revalue prime Seoul real estate; (5) commit 30%+ of any put-option cash inflows to shareholder returns. On Mar 10, 2025, Young Poong's board accepted three demands (treasury cancellation by March 2026, 10:1 split, and MUST's outside-director nominee Jeon Young-jun). The other three — put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation, 30%+ cash return — remained unresolved as of June 2026 and may be undergoing further negotiation (market view, not officially confirmed).
Why did Young Poong concede so quickly?
Three reasons. (1) Timing — Young Poong was deep into the 18-month Korea Zinc battle and had no bandwidth for a multi-month proxy fight on the side-front. (2) Indefensibility — President Kang's September 2024 statement against Korea Zinc's treasury policy contradicted Young Poong's own 10-year treasury inaction. Stretching out the fight would only deepen the moral damage. (3) Selective concession — three demands (treasury, split, director) had limited spillover into the Korea Zinc battle. Young Poong conceded the safe ones fast and deferred the dangerous ones (put-option disclosure, real-estate revaluation).
How does this campaign connect to the Korea Zinc–MBK dispute?
Two direct links. First, the weaknesses MUST targeted (Korea Zinc battle resource drain + operating losses + 10-year treasury inaction) are all tied to Young Poong's role in the main battle. Second, two of MUST's five demands (put-option disclosure, 30%+ cash return on put-option inflows) intervene directly in the battle's pricing mechanics. The April 2, 2026 Supreme Court ruling upholding Young Poong's vote restriction effectively closed the main battle and triggered re-evaluation of Young Poong's Korea Zinc put-option — making it the next key variable for MUST's residual agenda. This campaign is both the side-front and the aftermath of Korea's largest-ever control battle.
What does this mean for the Korean activism wave?
Three things. (1) Speed — ~3.5-4 months from open letter to executed core concessions, second only to Align's 2023 financial-holdings sweep (~1 month). (2) Target model — the first Korean domestic activist campaign to target a weaker affiliate inside a live, top-tier control battle, likely to become a template. (3) Analytical sophistication — the multi-layer thesis (treasury overhang + operating losses + battle resource drain + Korea Zinc put-option value) raises the bar for Korean activism analysis. MUST's Young Poong campaign extends the Korean wave's reach from individual companies to sectors to policy and now to chaebol-affiliate disputes.
What happens next with the residual demands?
As of June 2026, status is unconfirmed and market participants believe negotiation is ongoing. The April 2, 2026 Supreme Court ruling closing the Korea Zinc battle is the pivotal variable: with the dispute settled, Young Poong's put-option cash-flow timing and magnitude enter a restructuring phase, putting MUST's demands #3 (disclosure) and #5 (30%+ cash return) at the center of the next negotiating round. At the same time, with the main battle closed, Young Poong's incentive to settle the side-front quickly has weakened — making the path forward harder to predict. Some demands may have been withdrawn by MUST (not officially confirmed).
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Sources & Notes
- [1]MUST Asset Management — Open position paper on Young Poong shareholder value and governance (Nov 25, 2024)
- [2]BusinessWire — MUST Asset Management Launches Activist Campaign on Young Poong Corporation (Dec 3, 2024)
- [3]KED Global — Must Asset calls on Young Poong to take steps to boost shareholder value (Nov 25, 2024)
- [4]Bloomberg — Hedge Fund Returning 50% Calls Out Korean Corporate Hypocrisy (Dec 23, 2024)
- [5]Hedgeweek — Must Asset Management pushes for reform at South Korean conglomerate (Dec 2024)
- [6]Smartkarma / Douglas Research — Must Asset Mgmt Goes Activist on Young Poong (Dec 2024)
- [7]Digital Daily — Must Asset says 'Young Poong has not cancelled a single treasury share in 10 years' (Nov 26, 2024)
- [8]Financial News — Must Asset accumulates additional Young Poong shares after Kang Sung-doo remarks (Nov 25, 2024)
- [9]Seoul Economic Daily — Must Asset sends open letter to Young Poong: treasury cancellation, bonus issue (Nov 2024)
- [10]iNews24 — Must Asset shareholder proposal to Young Poong: treasury cancellation, Korea Zinc put option disclosure (Feb 2025)
- [11]Nate / Edaily — Must Asset face-to-face meeting with Young Poong (Dec 1, 2024)
- [12]Dealsite — Young Poong 2% holder Must Asset criticizes governance (Nov 2024)
- [13]Seoul Economic Daily — Young Poong: 'full treasury cancellation by March next year + 10:1 stock split' (Mar 10, 2025)
- [14]News1 — Young Poong recommends Jeon Young-jun as outside director per minority shareholder proposal (Mar 2025)
- [15]Segye Ilbo — Young Poong AGM agenda finalized including stock split (Mar 13, 2025)
- [16]G9 Inside — Shareholder activism succeeds: Young Poong agrees to treasury cancellation and stock split (Mar 2025)
- [17]ZDNet Korea — Young Poong shareholders including Must Asset call for governance reform (Feb 7, 2025)
- [18]UPI — Korea Zinc, Young Poong report opposite results in first half (Aug 19, 2025)
- [19]Korea Herald — Earnings gap widens as Korea Zinc rivals head to vote (2025)
- [20]Korea Times — Young Poong, MBK challenge Korea Zinc's $6.8 billion US smelter plan (Dec 15, 2025)
- [21]The Bell — Must Asset declares management participation in Taeyoung E&C (Aug 2019)
- [22]Wikipedia (Korean) — MUST Asset Management
- [23]MUST Asset Management official website
- [24]DART (Financial Supervisory Service) — Young Poong AGM result disclosure (Mar 27, 2025) + Young Poong annual reports FY2019-FY2024